Japan’s Gen X workers are struggling

学习目标

• 追踪初入职场的不利条件如何延续到晚年
• 区分就业身份、当期工资和终身收入
• 拆解两组定语从句、形式宾语与省略
• 用有条件的语言表达群体趋势和未来风险

FOR NEARLY two decades Torigoe Atsushi, who is 50, has worked in the stockrooms of a fashion firm in Tokyo. His income rose only modestly, and it recently fell after his employer cut bonuses and reworked its pay scheme; he now earns about ¥3.6m ($22,600) a year. Then he spotted the firm’s recruitment ads, offering newcomers higher salaries. “It’s great that younger people are getting better pay,” he says. “But why not raise mine?”

50岁的Torigoe Atsushi在东京一家时装公司的库房工作了近二十年。 他的收入只小幅增加，而最近，雇主削减奖金并调整薪酬制度后，收入反而下降；他现在每年挣约360万日元（2.26万美元）。 随后，他看到公司的招聘广告，给新员工开出的工资比他的更高。 他说：“年轻人的薪水更高了，这是好事。” “但为什么不给我也涨一涨呢？”

Mr Torigoe belongs to Japan’s “ice-age” generation: workers who entered the labour market between 1993 and 2004, after the country’s economic bubble burst and many companies stopped hiring. The ice-agers often endured years of insecure work and low pay. Now in their 40s and 50s (thus Generation X), they are losing out again. Japan is emerging from decades of deflation, prices are rising and companies are handing out their biggest pay increases in a generation. But the ice-agers are not benefiting. Worse may come when this cohort of baby-boomers’ children—the last bulge in Japan’s population pyramid (see chart)—drifts into retirement.

Torigoe先生属于日本的“就业冰河期”一代：他们在1993年至2004年间进入劳动力市场，当时日本经济泡沫已经破裂，许多企业停止招聘。 这一代人往往多年承受工作不稳定、薪酬偏低的处境。 如今，他们四五十岁了（因此文中称为X世代），却再次吃亏。 日本正在走出持续数十年的通缩，物价上涨，企业也给出了数十年来最大幅度的加薪。 但“冰河期”一代没有从中受益。 当这批婴儿潮一代的子女——日本人口金字塔上最后一处明显隆起（见图）——逐渐退休时，更糟的情况可能还在后面。

The ice-agers’ fortunes contrast starkly with those of the generation that came just before. During the bubble years of the 1980s, companies hired voraciously. College students found their mailboxes stuffed with offer letters, or were treated to fancy meals by employers keen to woo them. Everything changed as the bubble popped in the early 1990s. Japan’s rigid employment system made it hard for firms to shed existing workers, so they cut hiring instead. The ratio of job openings to college applicants fell from nearly three at its peak to below one by 2000. Nagai Toshihisa, who graduated in 1999, shortly after the Asian financial crisis, abandoned his hope of working for a securities firm. “It felt utterly stupid looking for jobs,” he recalls. Many in his generation sent out dozens, even hundreds, of applications, to no avail. It did not help that the ice-age cohort was such a big one, adding to the oversupply.

“冰河期”一代的际遇，与紧挨着他们之前的一代形成鲜明对照。 在20世纪80年代的泡沫时期，企业大举招人。 大学生发现信箱里塞满了录用通知，或者受到急于招揽他们的雇主邀请，享用丰盛餐食。 随着泡沫在90年代初破裂，一切都变了。 日本僵化的雇佣制度使企业很难裁减已有员工，因此它们转而削减招聘。 大学毕业生求职市场的职位空缺数与求职人数之比，从高峰时接近3降至2000年的不足1。 1999年、也就是亚洲金融危机后不久毕业的Nagai Toshihisa，放弃了去证券公司工作的希望。 他回忆说：“找工作这件事让人觉得简直傻透了。” 他们这一代中的许多人发出几十份甚至几百份申请，却一无所获。 “冰河期”这一群体规模如此庞大，进一步增加了劳动力供给过剩，也让情况更糟。

Many graduates who failed to secure regular jobs ended up in temporary or contract work. Japan’s labour market sharply distinguishes between regular workers, who enjoy strong legal protections and seniority-based pay rises, and irregular ones, who often do similar work for much less money and are the first to be laid off in downturns. Such jobs often used to be filled by housewives supplementing their husbands’ salaries. Increasingly, they were taken by young people who needed to support themselves, says Kondo Ayako of the University of Tokyo. The term “freeters”—youngsters drifting between casual jobs—became popular, as did “parasite singles”, who lived off their parents well into adulthood. There was also growing concern about hikikomori, social recluses.

许多未能找到正式工作的毕业生，最终从事临时或合同工作。 日本劳动力市场严格区分正式员工与非正式员工：前者享有较强的法律保护和按资历增长的薪酬，后者做的工作往往相似，收入却低得多，而且在经济低迷时首先被裁。 这类岗位过去往往由家庭主妇担任，用来补充丈夫的收入。 东京大学的Kondo Ayako说，后来越来越多需要自食其力的年轻人接下了这些工作。 “飞特族”——辗转于各种零工的年轻人——这一称呼流行起来；“寄生单身族”这一称呼也一样，指已经成年很久却仍靠父母生活的人。 人们也越来越担忧“蛰居族”，即与社会隔离、深居简出的人。

Time and acute labour shortages have repaired some of the damage. The share of ice-agers in regular employment has largely caught up with that of older cohorts, says Shimoda Yusuke of the Japan Research Institute. But their earnings have not. Those who spent long stretches in irregular work tend not to fully catch up even after switching to the regular track. Those in regular jobs faced another problem: the upper ranks of their companies were crowded with the bubble-era workers, delaying promotions for those who followed. Japan’s low labour mobility has meant the unlucky cohort cannot easily seek better pay elsewhere.

随着时间推移，加上严重的劳动力短缺，部分损伤得到了弥补。 日本综合研究所的Shimoda Yusuke说，“冰河期”一代正式就业的比例已大体追上更早出生的群体。 但他们的收入没有追上。 那些长期从事非正式工作的人，即使转入正式就业轨道，往往也无法完全追平收入。 正式员工面临另一个问题：企业高层职位挤满了泡沫年代入职的人，延缓了后来者的晋升。 日本劳动力流动性低，意味着这批运气不佳的人也不容易到别处谋求更高薪酬。

Japan’s economy is changing. After three decades of stagnation, wages are rising as inflation returns, and job-hopping is becoming more common. Yet these improvements are mostly benefiting the young. Companies short of labour are competing fiercely for fresh blood, and paying more to attract and retain it. Middle-aged employees are much less likely to switch jobs, giving firms little incentive to raise their wages. According to Kumano Hideo, an economist at Dai-ichi Life Research Institute, nominal wages for college-educated workers in their 20s and 30s were 10-16% higher in 2025 than five years earlier. Meanwhile, those in their early 50s suffered a nominal decline of 1.3%. Abe Katsuya, 48, says the large pay rises dished out to the young give him “mixed feelings”. He is part of the “Mammoth Club”, a support group for ice-agers who identify with the woolly beasts that endured harsh times.

日本经济正在变化。 经历三十年停滞之后，随着通胀回归，工资开始上涨，跳槽也变得更加普遍。 然而，这些改善主要惠及年轻人。 缺人的企业为争夺新鲜血液激烈竞争，并支付更高薪酬来吸引和留住他们。 中年员工换工作的可能性低得多，因此企业缺少为他们加薪的动力。 第一生命经济研究所的经济学家Kumano Hideo说，2025年，二三十岁、受过大学教育的劳动者的名义工资，比五年前高出10%至16%。 与此同时，五十出头的劳动者的名义工资下降了1.3%。 48岁的Abe Katsuya说，年轻人获得大幅加薪，让他“心情复杂”。 他是“猛犸俱乐部”的成员；这是一个“冰河期”一代的互助团体，成员对那些熬过严酷年代、浑身长毛的巨兽产生了认同。

All this has left the ice-agers with low lifetime earnings (and therefore little in the way of savings). That points to a looming crisis as they reach old age. Japan’s pension system ties payouts to lifetime earnings, so decades of suppressed pay will translate into low pensions. “Those who happened to come of age in a downturn are likely to carry that handicap for the rest of their lives,” laments Mr Kumano. Getting them to work longer, as a growing number of old people already do, is one fix but it will not solve everything. Ms Kondo warns that many may end up on welfare, which is not designed to support the elderly over extended periods. That would be costly; for instance, the state pays welfare recipients’ medical bills in full. And because the generations behind the ice-agers are smaller, fewer workers will have to support more pensioners.

这一切使“冰河期”一代的终身收入偏低（因此储蓄也很少）。 这预示着他们步入老年时，一场危机正在逼近。 日本养老金制度将给付与终身收入挂钩，因此几十年的低薪将转化为低养老金。 Kumano先生叹息说：“那些碰巧在经济低迷时期成年的人，很可能在余生中一直背负这份不利。” 让他们像越来越多的老年人已在做的那样，工作得更久，是一种补救办法，但无法解决所有问题。 Kondo女士提醒说，许多人最终可能依靠社会救助生活，而这套制度并不是为长期供养老年人设计的。 那样会花费很大；例如，国家全额支付救助对象的医疗费用。 而且，由于“冰河期”一代之后的几代人口更少，将有更少的劳动者供养更多退休者。

The woes of the ice-age generation have long had the government’s attention. For decades, authorities have come up with programmes to help them find jobs and nudge reclusive ones to connect with the outside world. Yet as the ice-agers grow older they face new problems. Beyond thin pensions and savings, questions loom, for instance, over housing; compared with older Japanese, this cohort is less likely to own homes, and Japan’s rental market is unfriendly towards older tenants. The government is belatedly adjusting: in April, it produced a three-year plan for the ice-agers, spanning measures from asset-building to housing. But a lot more serious thinking will be needed.

“冰河期”一代的困境早已引起政府注意。 几十年来，当局提出了各种计划，帮助他们找工作，并促使其中深居简出的人与外界建立联系。 然而，随着这一代人变老，他们面临新的问题。 除了微薄的养老金和储蓄，住房等问题也日益逼近；与更年长的日本人相比，这一群体拥有自住房的可能性更低，而日本租赁市场对年长租客并不友好。 政府正在迟来地作出调整：4月，它出台了针对“冰河期”一代的三年计划，措施涵盖资产积累到住房。 但还需要更深入、更认真的思考。

学习资料

精读音频 · 精读笔记